While fighting the current insurgency in Iraq, our military is once again re-learning the same lessons it forgot after Vietnam. One surprising fact I discovered while reading Fiasco by Thomas Ricks, a Pulitzer-prize winning writer for The Washington Post who is very well read on military and counter-insurgency matters, is that during the post-Vietnam era, the Army mothballed the counter-insurgency tactics and strategies in a desire to forget the Indochina experience. While some sections of the military, such as The U.S. Army Special Forces (which is almost a separate branch of the Army and thus not included in this critique), studied counter-insurgency methods and applied them successfully over the years, such strategies were largely ignored inU.S. Army doctrine, thus leaving our military woefully unprepared for recognizing and fighting an insurgency.
Colonel David Galula, a Frenchman, wrote what is considered by military experts to be the leading book on counter-insurgency: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (http://www.amazon.com/o/ASIN/0275993035/ref=s9_asin_title_1-1966_g1/103-4225939-7336636?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=center-1&pf_rd_r=062AAPXRKB5KVRNA8AV2&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=278240701&pf_rd_i=507846) It is only 97 pages but each sentence is a nugget of strategy and information for fighting an insurgency.
Col. Galula graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939 and served in the French army in the North Africa campaign and the liberation of Italy and France during World War II. In addition, he later served in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria, which gave him the opportunity to personally study the civil wars and insurgencies in each country.
There is a Rand report online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1/, from the early 1960's written by Col. Galula that forms the basis for this well-respected book. Rand has provided free versions for downloading. There is a 14 page summary, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.sum.pdf , and the much longer original report, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf.
If you do not wish to read the longer version, read its introduction as it contains some truly keen insights by the French Colonel:
•The absence of counterinsurgency doctrine: “In my zone, as everywhere in Algeria, the order was to ‘pacify.’ But exactly how? The sad truth was that, in spite of all our past experience,we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgencywarfare.”
Colonel David Galula, a Frenchman, wrote what is considered by military experts to be the leading book on counter-insurgency: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (http://www.amazon.com/o/ASIN/0275993035/ref=s9_asin_title_1-1966_g1/103-4225939-7336636?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=center-1&pf_rd_r=062AAPXRKB5KVRNA8AV2&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=278240701&pf_rd_i=507846) It is only 97 pages but each sentence is a nugget of strategy and information for fighting an insurgency.
Col. Galula graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939 and served in the French army in the North Africa campaign and the liberation of Italy and France during World War II. In addition, he later served in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria, which gave him the opportunity to personally study the civil wars and insurgencies in each country.
There is a Rand report online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1/, from the early 1960's written by Col. Galula that forms the basis for this well-respected book. Rand has provided free versions for downloading. There is a 14 page summary, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.sum.pdf , and the much longer original report, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf.
If you do not wish to read the longer version, read its introduction as it contains some truly keen insights by the French Colonel:
•The absence of counterinsurgency doctrine: “In my zone, as everywhere in Algeria, the order was to ‘pacify.’ But exactly how? The sad truth was that, in spite of all our past experience,we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgencywarfare.”
• The perils of failure to recognize the signs of a buddinginsurgency: “ ‘Ordinary banditry,’ said a high-ranking governmentofficial in Algiers . . . By the time the insurrectionwas finally recognized for what it was, only drastic politicaland military action would have reversed the tide, and slowlyin any case.” (Sound familiar? Remember when Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld casually dismissed any talk of an insurgency?)
• The insurgents’ urban terrorist strategy: “The rebels realizedthat they could achieve the greatest psychological effecton the French and on world opinion at the cheapest price bystepping up terrorism in the main cities, notably in Algiers,which served as headquarters to most French and foreign correspondentsand thus acted as a natural amplifier. A grenade or a bombin a café there would produce far more noise thanan obscure ambush against French soldiers in the Ouarsenis Mountains.”
• The imperative of separating the population from the insurgents:“Our forces were vastly superior to the rebels. Then whycouldn’t we finish with them quickly? Because they managedto mobilize the population through terror and persuasion . . .It was therefore imperative that we isolate the rebels from thepopulation and that we gain the support of the population.This implied that under no circumstances could we affordto antagonize the population even if we had to take risks forourselves in sparing it.” ( This is one of the reasons for the "surge". Give the Iraqis a measure of security and then they begin to help American troops as well as develop politically.)
• The concomitant imperative of not inadvertently alienatingthe indigenous population: “If we distinguish betweenpeople and rebels, then we have a chance. One cannot catch afly with vinegar. My rules are this: outwardly treat every civilianas a friend; inwardly you must consider him as a rebel allyuntil you have positive proof to the contrary.” (Our massive sweeps did not follow this principle and instead treated all Iraqis as the same, thus driving them into the arms of the insurgents.)
• Promoting women’s rights to counteract support for theinsurgents: “Reflecting on who might be our potential alliesin the population, I thought that the Kabyle women, giventheir subjugated condition, would naturally be on our side ifwe emancipated them.”
• The emphasis on policing rather than military tactics incountering an insurgency: “While the insurgent does nothesitate to use terror, the counterinsurgent has to engage inpolice work . . . The police work was not to my liking, but itwas vital and therefore I accepted it.”
• The fallacy of a decapitation strategy to defeat an insurgency:“Then, five top leaders of the rebellion, including BenBella, had been neatly caught during a flight from Rabat toTunis. Their capture, I admit, had little effect on the directionof the rebellion, because the movement was too looselyorganized to crumble under such a blow.” (This accounts for why the insurgents are not stopped even when we kill or capture Saddam, Zarqawi, and other leaders. How many times have we successfully taken out a leader of the enemy and then heard Sean Hannity et al crow about how we are turning the corner and the insurgency will decline, only to see that it keeps operating at the same levels? Their ignorance on counter-insurgency warfare is obvious as it is clear that the insurgents operate in cells, which avoids the dependence on top down leadership so prevalent in our military. Thus when we take out one leader, a few more pop up to replace him. The insurgents are not the Mafia, where the capture of a few Dons will destroy their effectiveness).
• The critical importance in a counterinsurgency of an effectiveinformation operations campaign: “If there was a fieldin which we were definitely and infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was propaganda.” (Any student of the Iraqi war will attest to the fact that we have completely failed to follow this principle. We were slow to combat the use of Al-Jazeera and other Arab media outlets by the insurgents. Nearly a year went by before we established a network in Iraq, thus giving the enemy time to spread its message unopposed. Considering the high rates of illiteracy in the Arab world, it is very crucial that this principle is followed when fighting the enemy).
• The importance of sealing off the borders: “The borders withMorocco and Tunisia would easily have required 100,000men to control with reasonable effectiveness, given theirlength and the local terrain. In order to save personnel, it wasdecided to build an artificial fence, a project which was completed along both borders by the spring of 1958.” (This was something we COMPLETELY failed to do in Iraq. Wolfowitz completely ignored the issue of the borders, thus resulting in a stream of assistance from Iran and Syria in much the same way China sent aid, advisers, and support to the Viet Minh. He thought that within a year or so after the overthrow of the regime was concluded, that only 30,000 or so troops were needed (P. 97 of Fiasco). When General Shinseki told Congress that probably close to 300,000 troops would be needed, he was publicly backstabbed by the Rummie/Wolfie axis even though he turned out to be correct. )
• The importance of according humane treatment to capturedinsurgents: “Throughout the war our prisoner camps wereopen for unannounced inspection by the International RedCross, the reports of which were made public . . . In the bestcamps, efforts were made to sift the tough prisoners from thesoft; where it was not done, the camps became schools forrebel cadres.” (Does this REALLY need any comment?)
It is quite clear that there is very little informed discussion about Iraq among our elites and those who consider themselves to be educated. The opponents of the war say bring them home now while ignoring the fact that due to logistics, it would require 12-18 months just to withdraw from Iraq. Too many of the more vocal hawks say we just need to put pressure on Iran and Syria, kill the leaders, and just pour more troops into the war. While they continously bicker, it is worth noting that counter-insurgency has been successfully fought in other areas. Colonel Galula had success against the Algerian rebels during his tenure in that country and observed the successful counter-insurgency in the Philipinnes. A reading of his counter-insurgency strategies will show exactly what we are fighting, how we have made serious mistakes in Iraq, and how best to correct those mistakes. There is much to be learned from his writings by both supporters and opponents of the Iraq War. One thing has not changed: the ability to forget hard-earned lessons while being impressed by ivory-tower credentials and titles. Hopefully, the perfumed princes in Washington and other places will realize the type of fight this war is and act accordingly.
additional posts on this blog on related topics:
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/07/use-of-internet-by-islamic-jihadists.html
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/06/good-interview-with-author-of-fiasco.html
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/06/jihadists-use-of-media-and-internet-to.html
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It is quite clear that there is very little informed discussion about Iraq among our elites and those who consider themselves to be educated. The opponents of the war say bring them home now while ignoring the fact that due to logistics, it would require 12-18 months just to withdraw from Iraq. Too many of the more vocal hawks say we just need to put pressure on Iran and Syria, kill the leaders, and just pour more troops into the war. While they continously bicker, it is worth noting that counter-insurgency has been successfully fought in other areas. Colonel Galula had success against the Algerian rebels during his tenure in that country and observed the successful counter-insurgency in the Philipinnes. A reading of his counter-insurgency strategies will show exactly what we are fighting, how we have made serious mistakes in Iraq, and how best to correct those mistakes. There is much to be learned from his writings by both supporters and opponents of the Iraq War. One thing has not changed: the ability to forget hard-earned lessons while being impressed by ivory-tower credentials and titles. Hopefully, the perfumed princes in Washington and other places will realize the type of fight this war is and act accordingly.
additional posts on this blog on related topics:
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/07/use-of-internet-by-islamic-jihadists.html
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/06/good-interview-with-author-of-fiasco.html
http://kingfish1935.blogspot.com/2007/06/jihadists-use-of-media-and-internet-to.html
