Jackson Jambalaya

The scheduling posture was not just background—it drove substance. To preserve the September trial date the court moved from a blanket “no-continuances” stance to coercive pretrial orders that short-circuited the Rules. Without the predicates required by MRCrP 12.2 and 17.4, the court compelled psychiatric examinations and broad disclosure of defense-held medical records, conferring a tactical advantage on the State and forcing premature exposure of defense strategy. 

Although Judge Arthur said there would be no continuances, Camp and Todd never tested the order by filing a motion for continuance.  

Murphy raised the issue of a Miller hearing. The Supreme Court banned mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of murder in Miller v. Alabama (2012). A hearing must be held to consider the defendant's age, mental capacity, circumstances of crime, family environment, and immaturity. The juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole but only after the Court holds such a hearing. 

 No Miller hearing was held in the Gregg case.  Murphy argues (p.40/31)* the parties were given no notice or time to prepare for sentencing proceedings as the jury immediately deliberated sentencing after finding Gregg guilty.  Thus the unprepared sentencing phase deprived Gregg of her meaningful opportunity to have a Miller hearing. The brief also notes the Court did not order a pre-sentence investigation for Gregg.  Gregg argues: 

Although the judge did ask first the State and then the defense whether they wished to call witnesses—and both declined—the parties were given no meaningful notice or time to marshal witnesses or otherwise prepare for a sentencing proceeding of this magnitude. Proceeding in that fashion denied Carly a real opportunity to present mitigation and fell short of the constitutional framework required by Miller v. Alabama.... (p. 41/33)

Todd and Camp made no arguments at sentencing nor did they present any family members on behalf of their client.  Todd later said she was too mad and emotional to make an argument at sentencing.   

Gregg asks the Court to remand the case for a Miller hearing and proper re-sentencing.  

Did prosecutors make inflammatory comments to the jury?  Gregg argues they did. The brief claims a prosecutor stated before the jury: 

If she is given the possibility of parole, no one in this room knows how long she will stay there. We cannot guarantee she will stay there one year or ten years. We have no control over that.

The brief calls the language "inflammatory fear-mongering", designed to prejudice the jury against Gregg.  One prosecutor said  said "if she were paroled, nothing would stopper her from walking into a school, a grocery store, of the movie theaters."  The comments should not have been allowed as the Mississippi Supreme Court bars lawyers from discussing potential sentences at trial. 

Gregg also takes issue with the prosecution calling her an adult at sentencing.  Although the Court certified Gregg as an adult for standing trial, it had to consider her as a juvenile for sentencing under Miller.   The defense did not object to these statements at trial.  However, Murphy argues the Court should review them for "plain error as he finally brings up an ineffectiveness of counsel claim: 

Alternatively, relief is warranted under Strickland v. Washington,... According to Mississippi courts, the “standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance involves a two-pronged inquiry: the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case.” Ross v. State... The first prong takes into account whether an attorney’s actions or inactions were reasonable under all the circumstances, and considering whether such conduct was a result of trial strategy... No reasonable strategy supports allowing the prosecutor to (1) misstate parole consequences, (2) advance golden-rule/community-alarm hypotheticals, and (3) press for juvenile LWOP without objection or a request for curative instructions. Counsel also failed to insist on a true Miller hearing—or at minimum a continuance—to marshal mitigation witnesses and evidence tailored to the Miller factors. This performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different (at least life with parole or deferral to judge for term sentencing). The combination of an abbreviated, unprepared “hearing” and uncorrected, prohibited argument undermines confidence in the sentence and satisfies both Strickland prong...

 The jury sentenced Gregg to life without parole for both first-degree murder and attempted murder.  However, Gregg could not be sentenced to life without parole under the Miller case, argues Murphy.  

The brief attacks the sentencing and verdict on other issues as well.  Strong exception is taken to allowing counselor Rebecca Kirk to summarize a book, Crime and Punishment, over defense objections, a book Gregg said she never read. (p.67/59)

In front of the jury, Kirk delivered a lurid synopsis—describing a “psychopath” student who plans a hatchet murder, kills two people, writes about “why people kill,” is “declared insane,” and serves eight years “unrepentant” in a Russian labor camp (Tr. 1228). She then admitted her underline of the title in the note was “just for grammar,” not clinical emphasis as had been misrepresented to the trial judge by the State. (Tr. 1228). Kirk further conceded the note reflected Carly had not yet read the book on 2/21 and that she only “think[s]” Carly read it later over spring break (Tr. 1229).

Gregg argues the only purpose of such testimony was to inflame the jury. 

The Court also mistakingly ordered a competency exam and McNaughten insanity evaluation for Gregg on July 3, 2024 even though the defense had not filed a notice of a defense of insanity.  The Court did so because it anticipated an insanity defense and wanted to keep to the September trial date. Prosecution should have waited until noticed of an insanity defense before asking the Court for the exams. The state had no reasonable grounds for asking for such exams nor did the court cite any reasonable grounds for ordering the exams. 

* There is a large discrepancy between page numbers as they appear in adobe and the actual page numbers in the brief.  For your convenience, the adobe page number is listed first, then the brief's page number.