Jackson Jambalaya

The scrum between Jackson Academy and Jason and Carolyn Voyles continues as they argue over whether their dispute should be heard in court or arbitration.  

The Voyleses sued the school in Hinds County Court on January 5, accusing the school of terminating their son's enrollment after the couple blew the whistle on its alleged recruiting of athletes from public schools.  

JA filed a motion to compel arbitration on January 30.  The school argued the enrollment contract requires all disputes be settled through arbitration. However, the motion did not follow the path of a typical motion to compel arbitration as it used the motion to strike back publicly at the Voyleses. Arbitration and humiliation. Two birds, one stone.  Earlier post. 

JA inserted in its motion to compel excerpts of a four-page email from Mrs. Voyles that well, did not exactly cast her in a flattering light.  What was interesting was JA did not included a copy of the entire email in its motion. 

The Voyleses wasted no time returning fire with a response to the motion that included a proposed amended complaint and an affidavit by Carolyn Voyles.  

Mrs. Voyles stated in her affidavit the contract on the school's website did not allow her to make any changes, thus creating the impression it was a "standard enrollment contract."  She said she and her husband were under the impression that their son would not be allowed to continue at Jackson Academy if they did not sign the contract as issued.  Thus they were forced into a "take it or leave it" contract.  

Jackson Academy and Mr. Wettech responded with a reply brief in support of its motion to compel arbitration on March 20.  The defendants wasted no time thrashing the Voyleses in the opening paragraph: 

Seeking to publicize their claims and damage the school’s reputation, however, the Voyles breached their agreement by filing their complaint in court and then disseminating it through the media. Now, they seek to justify their breach as asserted victims of contractual “oppression,” falsely suggesting that JA forced them to sign the agreement, so as to analogize their situation to cases of genuinely egregious, and wholly distinguishable, circumstances. The argument is as ridiculous as the Voyles’ underlying claims.* 

Ouch. The defendants argued the Voyleses were not denied "meaningful choice" and are not victims of contract abuse. The arbitration clause in the contract is routine. The Voyleses claimed the enrollment contract was a contract of adhesion. Such contracts are provided on a "take it or leave it" basis, leaving no room for negotiation. The reply states:

The sole evidence offered to support this contention is an affidavit executed by Carolyn Voyles, wherein she testifies that the enrollment agreement was “presented . . . in an electronic format” on a “website . . . [that] did not provide any opportunity to make changes to the document,” and that, as “[she] understood it, . . . [she] would either have to sign the contract as it was presented in the system, or C.V. would not be able to attend Jackson Academy during the 2025-26 school year.”  Based on that testimony, the Voyles suggest unconscionability on the basis that they had “no meaningful choice.” The argument is both factually unsupported and legally misplaced.

JA charges Carolyn Voyles of having it all wrong as "no provision in the contract prohibited modification." Indeed, the defendants state:

Every provision in this Contract is severable. . . . No waiver of any of the provisions of this Contract shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, not shall any wavier constitute a continuing waiver. No amendment to this Contract and no alteration or addition to the printed terms hereof will be effective without the express prior written approval of the School’s Board of Trustees.

The Voyleses made no attempt to modify the contract, claimed JA. They never voiced any objections to the contract terms even though they had five months to do so. The Voyleses are accused of being somewhat duplicitous in only seeking to invalidate the arbitration clause instead of the entire contract.

JA argues the Voyleses can not claim they did not understand the contract:

the Voyles have not even attempted to satisfy their evidentiary burden that their agreement was a product of “external” constraint. Nor could they. As evidenced by their own correspondence to the school, the Voyles are highly educated, wealthy, and experienced. They are well trained in business affairs and matters of contract. They have multiple college and post-graduate degrees. Mrs. Voyles has a law degree. The missing evidence is fatal to the Voyles’ argument.

 

The defendants close by addressing the matter of punitive damages.   This is the first time the issue has reared its head but JA has been doing the plaintiffs a favor.  

By contrast, the Voyles have brought a most dubious “breach of contract” case predicated on the assertion that JA’s express contractual “right to terminate” an enrollment agreement was erroneously exercised. Even if the Voyles had not breached the rules and policies set forth in the Student Handbook (they did), and even if the Voyles had not breached their agreement to maintain a “positive and constructive” relationship (they did), and even if it was not reasonable for JA to view the Voyles’ egregious actions worthy of termination (it clearly was), the Voyles suffered no compensable loss.8 And because a compensatory award is a prerequisite to punitive damages, the Voyles have no possible route to such rare relief.

Thus the Voyles are not entitle to punitive damages but JA argues it might be so entitled:

On the other hand, the Voyles’ conduct easily qualifies as that for which punitive damages are purposed, i.e., to deter conduct tainted by “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or . . . actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65. As explained in JA’s principal motion, the Voyles acted surreptitiously (by recording conversations in violation of school policy), in bad faith (by breaching their obligation of acting in a positive and cooperative manner through doxxing JA students and placing them and the school in a bad light), with deceit (by attempting with undisclosed purpose to obtain identities of students they would later demean), and in reckless disregard for the rights of others (by publicly demeaning the school and its students). The Voyles have further abused the litigation process by bringing patently frivolous claims for the improper and ulterior purpose of harassment.

9 These actions were malicious and taken with the intent to cause harm. JA is the only party justified in seeking punitive damages in this case, and so the bilateral punitive damages waiver only favors the Voyles.

Yup. The contract protects the Voyles because it disallows punitive damages.  Thus the Voyles benefit from the contract's waiver.  The reply brief concluded with a little warning: